Of Bulls and Calves

Despite the widely accepted Nepali adage ?Saandheko judhaai, baachhaa ko michaai? (bulls? fight, calves? last rite), it is disheartening to notice that we cannot but enjoy watching sadistic saandhe games. Maitidevi is no Madrid; Haribhakta is no Hemingway; and Manmohan is no matador. Yet we seem to enjoy bullfighting a lot more than the Spanish do. The bull is the flagrant husband of our holy cow. So, the bulls have some derived holiness and it is probably a sin to watch them fighting. The thought of sin reminds me of our culture, which is supposedly full of such values as ahimsa, daya, and viveka. Enamoured with them, Eliot thundered ?Datta, Dayadhvam, Damyata? in the Wasteland. Has the time of Eliot gone and the mime of idiots started? You may say, ?Come on dude, this is a dog-eat-dog world where the only sense is the economic sense and the only lens is the myopic lens.? To counteract this argument, let me demonstrate that the Nash equilibrium of the game of bullfighting is to stop naash (destruction) by refusing to fight further. Suppose there are two players called bull1 and bull2, who are engaged in bullfighting. Calves, due to their hereditary bovineness, do not participate or are kicked out of this game. Unfortunately, their payoff is tied with the decision of the bulls and thereby with the outcome of this game. The table at the end shows the payoff matrix for bull1, bull2, and calves.

Each bull has two options: cooperate with the other and stop fighting, or do not cooperate and keep fighting. The three terms in the parenthesis refer to the payoffs for bull1, bull2, and calves respectively. For example, when bull1 does not cooperate but bull 2 does, bull1 receives the lofty prize while bull2 pays the hefty price. The calves will receive a medium prize because the fight has stopped but the bull1 has also become stronger. When bull1 and bull2 both cooperate, then each of them will receive a middle-sized prize that is smaller than what each would ideally like to have. However, the calves would benefit the most in this situation. Similarly, when both bulls decide not to cooperate, then payoffs for all would be the smallest. It is definitely discomforting to find out how long the bulls can or will keep fighting before reaching the stable Nash or the hysterical mass naash.

If bulls were rational, then they would decide to cooperate and stop fighting. But perhaps the bulls are just like the ?Rebel without a cause? teenager and it is sad that ?nobody talks to calves.?

Payoff table

Gokul ji... the third option is for the bull to walk away from the arena, thus making space for younger calves to resume the show. Assuming that the young calves have learned from the old bulls' mistakes they will cooperate for their own survival and/or the survival of the herd.

Just a thought!

Not that I am trying to second guess Gokul, the representation of my understanding of the situation of two bulls and one calf is as table below.

As you can see, obviously, the best result will come from both parties cooperating. But the prisoners dilemma dictates that if one should cooperate and other does not reciprocate, one's situation will drop to "low" whereas if one does not budge from one's uncooperative stance, one remains at "middle" which one may find acceptable.

Who cares about the calf... bulls rule, one way or the other.

Good one Gokul ji.

Sitara, the bulls don't even have to walk completely away..they can stay within the viscinity and become mentors to the calves just in case their guidance is needed, if they're worth...what do you think?